Medical Profession—Anti-Kickback Statute: Licensed Medical Practitioners May Not Receive Financial Benefits from Referral of Patients or Sale of Medical Supplies to Patients.—Day v. Inland Empire Optical, Inc., 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 1011 (1969); RCW ch. 19.68 (1969) by anon,
Washington Law Review 
Volume 45 Number 4 
6-1-1970 
Medical Profession—Anti-Kickback Statute: Licensed Medical 
Practitioners May Not Receive Financial Benefits from Referral of 
Patients or Sale of Medical Supplies to Patients.—Day v. Inland 
Empire Optical, Inc., 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 1011 (1969); 
RCW ch. 19.68 (1969) 
anon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
anon, Recent Developments, Medical Profession—Anti-Kickback Statute: Licensed Medical Practitioners 
May Not Receive Financial Benefits from Referral of Patients or Sale of Medical Supplies to Patients.—Day 
v. Inland Empire Optical, Inc., 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 1011 (1969); RCW ch. 19.68 (1969), 45 
Wash. L. Rev. 838 (1970). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol45/iss4/9 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
MEDICAL PROFESSION-ANTI-ICKBACK STATUTE: LICENSED MEDICAL
PRACTITIONERS MAY NOT RECEIVE FINANCIAL BENEFITS FROm REFER-
RAL OF PATIENTS OR SALE OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO PATIENTS.-Day
v. Inland Empire Optical, Inc., 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 566, 456 P.2d
1011 (1969); RCW ch. 19.68 (1969).
The five defendant ophthalmologists and defendant Inland Empire
Optical, Inc., whose stock was wholly owned by these doctors, oc-
cupied the same building.' Inside the waiting rooms of the doctors'
offices were three strategically placed signs which informed patients
of the presence of the optical shop on the floor below. Plaintiff doctors
and a corporate optical firm brought suit to enjoin this cooperative
practice, alleging a violation of Washington's anti-kickback statute.2
Upon defendants' appeal from a superior court decree granting the
injunction, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed as modified. Held:
Ophthalmologists are entitled to own stock in a dispensing optical
company, but only if they neither directly nor indirectly refer their
1. Inland occupied the bottom floor, and the doctors operated their clinic above.
Inland's main entrance way faced a parking lot. This entrance way contained no
markings to indicate the nature of the business within. The only other entrance to
Inland's premises was from a stairway leading down from the reception hallway of
the doctor's offices.
2. Plaintiffs contended that defendant doctors were acting in violation of WASH.
Rxv. CODE § 19.68.010 (1969) by receiving a rebate in the form of an appreciation in
the value of their Inland Empire Optical, Inc. stock, allegedly caused by referral of their
patients to Inland Empire Optical. Twenty other doctors of various specializations
intervened; the Eye and Ear Physicians' Council of Washington State filed an amicus
brief; and the Attorney General entered as a friend of the court at the request of the
Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board. The superior court held that there had
been a rebate from Inland to defendant doctors and that this rebate had resulted from
patient referrals. In dictum the superior court judge expressed the view that WAsH. REv.
CODE § 19.68.010 (1969) made it illegal for doctors to hold stock in a corporation that
dispenses medical supplies, or to charge for any other medical services besides those
personally performed.
WAsH. REv. CODE § 19.68.010 (1969) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, whether
organized as a cooperative, or for profit or non profit, to pay, or offer to pay or
allow, directly or indirectly, to any person licensed by the state of Washington to
engage in the practice of medicine and surgery, drugless treatment in any form, or
dentistry, and it shall be unlawful for such person to request, receive or allow,
directly or indirectly, a rebate, refund, commission, unearned discount or profit by
means of a credit or other valuable consideration in connection with the referral
of patients to any person, firm, corporation or association, or in connection with
the furnishings of medical, surgical, or dental care, diagnosis, treatment or service,
on the sale, rental, furnishing or supplying of clinical laboratory supplies or services
of any kind, or any other goods, services or supplies prescribed for medical diagnosis,
care or treatment.
Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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patients to it. Day v. Inland Empire Optical, Inc., 76 Wash. Dec. 2d
566, 456 P.2d 1011 (1969).
A number of cases filed in 1948 by the Department of Justice
against some 4000 doctors provided the stimulus for anti-kickback
statutes such as Washington's R.C.W. ch. 19.68. United States v.
American Optical Co.,4 for example, involved a class action by the
Department of Justice against approximately 2000 physicians who
were accused of sharing profits from the sale of optical equipment
with the defendant American Optical. The defendants were charged
with conspiring to influence patients to have their prescriptions filled
at American Optical, which added extra charges for fitting fees and
then split half the consumer price with the doctors. Defendants were
enjoined from receiving payments under these arrangements. The
court expressed the view that such rebate arrangements should be
eliminated since they tended to monopolize the optical trade.5
In response to the American Optical decision the Federal Trade
Commission promulgated its own anti-kickback rules,6 prohibiting
the payment by a dispenser to a doctor of any funds or other valuable
consideration for the sale of optical equipment to a patient of the
doctor. The Washington legislature7 and the legislatures of several
other states' followed the lead of the F.T.C. and passed remedial
legislation.
Two primary objectives of such laws were protection of the public
3. See Comment, Physician Ownership of Pharmacies, 41 NOTRE DAMrE LAWYER 49,
65 (1965), for a more detailed account.
4. 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
5. Id.
6. Now embodied in 16 C.F.R. § 192.7 (1968).
7. See Wash. Att'y Gen., Memorandum No. 651, as reprinted in Brief for Respon-
dent at A-1, Day v. Inland Empire Optical Inc., 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 1011
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Inland].
The Attorney General of Washington commented that the "practice of a few licen-
tiates of the healing arts . . " who were receiving rebates was the major cause for the
enactment of WAsH. REV. CODE ch. 19.68 in 1949. This was apparently also the case
with the California statute. See note 8 infra.
8. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 650 (West 1962) provides:
The offer, delivery, receipt, or acceptance, by any person licensed under this divi-
sion of any unearned rebate, refund, commission, preference, patronage dividend,
discount, or other unearned considerattion, whether in the form of money or other-
wise, as compensation or inducement for referring patients, clients, or customers to
any person, irrespective of any membership, propriety interest or co-ownership in
or with any person to whom such patient, clients, or customers are referred is
unlawful.
See note 26 infra for citations to statutes in other jurisdictions.
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from hidden rebates and charges, and the elimination of a potential
motive to make unnecessary prescriptions.9 The American Medical
Association realized this when it declared such practices unethical,"
and threatened expulsion of anyone entering into such arrangements.
However, the various state legislatures apparently determined that
expulsion from the A.M.A. was not a sufficient deterrent, and con-
sequently, appropriate legislation was enacted to provide stiffer penal-
ties for those entering into such arrangements."
Such was the origin of R.C.W. ch. 19.68.12 Yet, despite the fact
that twenty years had passed since the enactment of R.C.W. ch. 19.68,
Inland was the first case in which the Washington court addressed
itself to that statute. The court had to base its decision, therefore, on
its own interpretation of the statute. 3
9. Wash. Att'y Gen., Memorandum No. 651, supra note 8, at A-9; 16 O'. CAL. ATTry
GEN. 18 (1950). The dubious nature of such kickback arrangements was summed up by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lilly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 188
F.2d 269, 271 (4th Cir. 1951):
The evil we find in these kickbacks is the receipt by the physician of secret profits
through dealings with his patients. Surely the doctor is assuming an utterly in-
consistent position when he recommends an optician without disclosing that he is
being paid for the recommendation. This corrupt practice obviously involves or
tends to promote serious evils: (1) the prescription by the doctor of glasses where
not actually necessary; (2) more expensive lenses than really needed; (3) recom-
mendation of an inferior optician; (4) artificial increase in cost of glasses by
inclusion of the physician's commission for which the physician affords no value
to the patient.
10. It should be well known by this time that the traditional interpretation of
the Principles of Medical Ethics by the various judicial Councils in the history of
the Association has been that the doctor may receive no profit whatever from his
patient other than payment for rendered medical services. Hence it would be ap-
parent that no rebate of any kind, in any form or from any source can be accepted.
This applies also to rebates coming from agents or owners of optical companies.
They are, in every case, absolutely unethical.
AixR. MED. Assoc., JUDICIAL CouNcIL, OPINIONS AND REPORTS, REBATES FROM SALE OF
MEDICINES OR APPLIANCES, 55 (1960).
11. See note 26 inlra for exemplary citations.
12. In 1965, WAsr. REv. CODE ch. 19.68 was amended since there appeared to be
considerable question concerning the validity of a title as broad as the 1949 title. The
1965 amendment changed the title to "An Act Relating to the Practitioners of the
Healing Professions and Prohibiting Certain Practices Thereto." Also some minor
changes were made in various sections of the statute.
13. The court was also faced with the issue of whether or not the decision of the
Washington State Medical Disciplinary Board was controlling in the case. The Washing-
ton State Medical Disciplinary Board did not find defendants guilty of any unethical
practice. The appellants contended that the decision of the Board should be final. The
court ruled that, while the Disciplinary Board could discipline the members of the
medical profession for unethical activities, only the courts may interpret, apply, and
enforce a statute which provides criminal sanctions.
The court also held that the respondents had standing to bring this suit to enjoin
defendants' operation for two reasons: (1) to prevent unfair competition, and (2) to
force other physicians to abide by the laws regulating the practice of medicine. This
840
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Appellant Inland Empire Optical, Inc. cited statutory authority for
its position that an ophthalmologist may employ or have a licensed
optician working in his office dispensing optical equipment,14 and col-
lect compensation for his services.' 5 The court agreed that an ophthal-
mologist may employ or have a licensed optician associate with him
in his office, and that compensation can be received for this employee
or associate's services. It held, however, that the statutes relied upon
by the optical company did not apply to the facts of this case, since
there was a lack of "personal and immediate direction and super-
vision?' by the ophthalmologist of the licensed optician's work, and
since the spatial relationship between the offices of the doctors and
those of Inland was such that patients would not readily perceive that
Inland was operating under the direction of the doctors. 6
Since the laws did not explicitly authorize the arrangement attacked
in this case, the court turned to the anti-kickback statute, R.C.W. ch.
19.68,17 to determine whether there had been a violation. The statute
prohibits the furnishing of medical supplies to patients, or the referral
by physicians of patients to a medical supply company, in return for,'
directly or indirectly, a rebate, refund, commission, unearned
discount, or profit by means of a credit or other valuable con-
sideration ....
aspect of the decision is beyond the scope of this note. See Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash.
371, 12 P.2d 401 (1932); State v. Boren, 42 Wn. 2d 155, 253 P.2d 939 (1953); and
Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wn. 2d 697, 251 P.2d
619 (1952) (members of a profession may bring suit to enjoin other members from
violating statute regulating the profession). Cf. Port of Seattle v. Int'l Longshoremen's
& Warehousemen's Union, 52 Wn. 2d 317 324 P.2d 1099 (1958) (conditions necessary
to obtain an injunction against the harmful conduct of another).
14. WASH. RaV. CODE § 18.4.010 (1957).
15. WAS. RaV. CODE § 19.68.040 (1957).
16. The test for such supervison as applied by the court in Inland is:
[w]hether a patient of ordinary understanding and reasonable prudence should
reasonably understand that eyeglasses dispensed by the ophthalmologist's dispensing
optician are in fact under not only the personal and immediate direction and
supervision of the ophthalmologist, but at his responsibility as well. If the circum-
stances are such that the answer to this query is in the affirmative, then the ophthal-
mologist, we think, is within his statutory rights under RCW 19.68. If, however,
the relationship between ophthalmologist and optician is so remote, indirect or
distant that [he] is not under the immediate, personal supervision of the ophthal-
mologist, or their offices and laboratories are so physically separated that a patient
of ordinary understanding would not readily assume that the optician is working
for and under the physician's personal direction-and on the latter's responsibility-
then the test of the statute is not met ....
76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 578-79, 456 P.2d at 1019 (1969)..
17. See Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 577, 456 P.2d at 1018 (1969).
18. WAsH. Rav. Co § 19.68.010 (1969) (text set out in full in note 2 supra).
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Appellant doctors argued that they received only the appreciation of
the value of the stock. The court noted, however, that as long as the
physician benefited from the referrals, it did not matter whether or
not he received the benefit in the form of an actual cash dividend or
an appreciation in the value of the stock.1 9
The key to the Inland decision was the question of referral. The
court saw nothing wrong with either the doctors' ownership of a
medical supply company, or their receipt of profits from its opera-
tions °. 2 It is only when the physician refers the patient to such a medi-
cal supply company that he violates the provisions of R.C.W.
§ 19.68.010.21 In Inland, the spatial relationship between the doctors'
offices and the optical supply company, along with the three strategi-
cally placed signs, 22 constituted the referral necessary for violation
of the statute. The locations of the offices resulted in the channeling
of patients from the doctors' offices through the optical company, thus
limiting in effect the patient's freedom of choice as among the firms
which could fill his prescription. Out of convenience it was not prac-
tical to go elsewhere.2
Although the Washington court stated that it was not going to
provide a "general juridical catalog of basic rules for the ethical prac-
tice of medicine and its allied arts,"2 4 it did establish some basic
guidelines for medical practitioners under R.C.W. ch. 19.68 and
§ 18.34.010. These guidelines are important, not only to ophthalmolo-
gists, but to any other persons2 5
licensed by the state of Washington to engage in the practice of
medicine and surgery, drugless treatment in any form, or den-
tistry ...
19. Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 576, 456 P.2d at 1017.
20. Id. at 579, 456 P.2d at 1019.
21. Id.
22. The signs read:
FOR GLASSES
We have an optical shop downstairs
for your convenience.
However, please feel free to take your
prescription to the optician of your choice
Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 571, 456 P.2d at 1015 (1969).
23. The record indicated that 85 to 90 percent of the doctors' patients had their
eyeglass prescriptions filled by Inland Empire Optical. 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 571, 456
P.2d at 1015 (1969).
24. Id. at 568, 456 P.2d at 1013.
25. WAsH. REV. CODE § 19.68.010 (1969).
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They might apply, for instance, to the "referral" of patients by a
general practitioner to a pharmacy, or by a surgeon to a retailer of
therapeutical braces, or by a dentist to an orthodontist, or by an ear
specialist to a hearing aid company. They could also help in the
future construction of the "furnishings" provision, which applies in
cases where the physician himself distributes clinical supplies to his
patients. Against the background of the potentially broad applicability
of the Inland guidelines, the first two following sections of this note
analyze the basic requirements for a violation of R.C.W. ch. 19.68-
(1) a rebate or profit, and (2) either a referral or the furnishing of
prescribed supplies. The third section discusses the employee excep-
tion to the statute.
I. REBATES AND PROFITS
The Washington legislature believed that illegal benefit to physicians
could occur in many different forms. R.C.W. § 19.68.010 prohibits a
physician from receiving in certain cases a26
rebate, refund, commission, unearned discount or profit by means
of a credit or other valuable consideration....
There is no doubt that the statute would cover the kind of direct
benefit involved in the leading case of American Optical,17 which in-
volved a cash rebate on glasses equal to the difference between (1) the
prescription price plus fitting fees and (2) the price collected from the
patient. Inland makes it clear that stock appreciation is likewise
sufficient. Other state courts and the F.T.C. have ruled that such
things as stock dividends28 and rent on a percentage of sales29 are
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.68.010 (1969) (emphasis added).
The anti-kickback statutes of other states have similar catch-all phrases, such as
"otherwise" or just the general term "rebate."
Those state statutes using the catch-all term "otherwise" are: N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 67,
§ 5-9C (1953), CAL. Bus. & PRoP. CODE § 650 (West 1950), ARx. STAT. ANN. ch. 70,
§ 307 (1947). Those state statutes using "rebate" as the catch-all term in their anti-
kickback statutes are: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 13, § 32-1401(f) (1956), IowA CODE
ANN. ch. 147, § 147.56(4) (1939), OxLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 24, art. 59, § 944 (1963).
27. 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1951) (discussed at notes 4 & 5 and accompanying
text supra).
28. See the letters from the Department of Justice to various doctors in response
to inquiries concerning the rules, as cited in appendix to 16 C.F.R. § 192.0-192.21
(Supp. 1970).
29. Magan Medical Clinic v. California State Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal.
App. 2d 124, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 262 (1967).
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rebates. As a general rule, then, whenever the physician will benefit
financially ° in any way by receipt of either a rebate for the referral
of his patients to a dispenser of medical supplies or services, or a profit
from the sale by him of medical supplies to his patients, that financial
benefit will constitute a violation.
The superior court in Inland had construed the statute to flatly pro-
hibit all physician ownership of a medical service or supply opera-
tion. 31 A reading of R.C.W. § 19.68.010 alone indicates how the su-
perior court reached its conclusion. That section states in part that it
is illegal for a physician to receive:32
. . . [V]aluable consideration in connection with the referral of
patients to any person, firm, corporation or association, or in
connection with the furnishings of medical, surgical, or dental
care, diagnosis, treatment, or service, on the sale, rental, fur-
nishing or supplying of clinical laboratory supplies or services
of any kind, or any other goods, services or supplies prescribed
for medical diagnosis, care or treatment.
It is possible to read that section as prohibiting (1) the referral of
patients for valuable consideration to any person, firm, corporation,
or association, and then also prohibiting (2) the receipt of valuable
consideration by the doctor in connection with the furnishing of an-
cillary services and supplies by anyone. But under this interpretation,
the latter prohibition would apply to any physician-owned stock in an
optical supply corporation, even if no patients of the doctor had ever
patronized it, and even if the doctor only owned several shares in a
large, publicly-owned corporation.
The supreme court, however, thought that the statute did not pro-
hibit physician ownership of a medical supply operation, or the receipt
of compensation for such ownership, as long as the physician did not
also refer his patients to that operation.3 3 R.C.W. ch. 19.68, when
30. The term "financial benefit" is used because, in each of the cases cited in this
note, the kickback was either in the form of money, or could be converted into money,
or had resulted in a saving of money.
31. Brief for Rockwood Clinic as Amicus Curiae at 5, Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 566,
456 P.2d 1011 (1969).
32. WAsH. Rtv. CODE § 19.68.010 (1969) (emphasis added). The section is quoted
in full in note 2 supra.
33. Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 579, 456 P.2d at 1019 (1969).
The court may have been influenced in part by the potential harm which the superior
844
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construed as a whole,34 supports such an interpretation, as Parts II
and III of this Note will show.
II. REFERRALS AND FURNISHINGS
A. Referrals
The statute prohibits a rebate or profit3 5
in connection with the referral of patients to any person, firm,
corporation or association . . . on the sale, rental, furnishing or
supplying of clinical laboratory supplies ....
The referral may be a direct instruction to a patient, in either verbal 6
or written37 form, to seek the supplies or services of another. The
referral may also be given indirectly, as was the case in Inland. While
the Inland court did not provide explicit criteria for the physician to
follow in order to avoid the elusive "indirect referral," it did state
tha 38
[the] patient [must] have free and untrammelled access and
exit to and from the doctors' offices without having to pass into
or through the optical company's offices ...
court decision could have had. The effect of a broader rule on the integrated medical
clinics of the state, for nxample, would have been rather burdensome. Many of these
clinics would have had to modify their present operations, and many services now
provided to the patient would have suffered. Amicus Brief for Rockwood Clinic, supra
note 31, at 6. See also Brief for Eye and Ear Physicians' Council of Washington State
as Amicus Curiae at 2, Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 1011 (1969).
34. This approach to deciding legislative meaning is consistent with past Washington
decisions. It has been held that the intention of the legislature in the enactment of a
regulating measure must be determined from consideration of all its provisions, and that
it is the duty of the court to adopt a construction that is not only reasonable, but also
furthers the obvious and manifest purpose of the legislature. See, e.g., State v. Lee,
62 Wn. 2d 288, 382 P.2d 491 (1963).
Construction of a statute as a whole must be done in order to avoid unlikely, strained,
or absurd consequences which could result from literal readings. Alderwood Water Dist.
v. Pope and Talbot Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 319, 382 P.2d 639 (1963). See also Krystad v. Lau,
65 Wn. 2d 827, 400 P.2d 72 (1965).
35. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.68.010 (1967).
36. In the American Optical case, 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. 11. 1951) (see notes 4 & 5
and accompanying text supra), it was contended that after writing the prescription
the doctor would then orally instruct the patient to take his prescription to American
Optical.
37. In Mast v. State Board of Optometry, 139 Cal. 78, 293 P.2d 148 (1956), the
patient was given a slip of paper with his prescription on it. At the top were the
words "Referred to Dr. A. R. Mast"; the patient almost invariably went to Dr. Mast
for his prescription glasses.
38. Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 579, 456 P.2d at 1019 (1969).
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In other words, the patient must have relative freedom to choose
whomever he wants to fill his prescription. Thus, the "indirect re-
ferral" can be almost any act of the physician which interferes with
the patient's free choice of a supplier of "clinical laboratory supplies"
and which tends to make him a captive consumer.39
The spatial relationship between the doctors' offices and the optical
company in Inland was such that a patient attempting to reach his
car in the parking lot would have no choice but to go through the
optical company's waiting room. The resulting temptation to buy as
a matter of convenience effectively conditioned the consumer's free-
dom of choice.4" There would have been no "referral," however, had
the offices of the doctors been unconnected by doors with the offices
of the optical company." Other examples of indirect referral would
be where the doctor writes out his prescription in code and only one
pharmacy knows the code, or where the name of one pharmacy is
printed on the top of the prescription.
B. Furnishings
R.C.W. § 19.68.010 provides that a physician may not request or
receive a profit43
• . . in connection with the furnishings of medical, surgical or
dental care, diagnosis, treatment or service...
when such profit is44
. . . on the sale, rental, furnishing or supplying of clinical lab-
oratory supplies....
In Inland the defendants were guilty of profiting on their referrals,
and the court dealt specifically with this violation. For this reason,
39. See Comment, Physician Ownership of Pharmacies, 41 NomR DA E LAWYER 49,
53 (1965).
40. See note 23 supra.
41. While this is not expressly stated by the court, it is inferred from the language
used. Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 576, 456 P.2d at 1018 (1969). A similar conclusion
was reached in In re Sanchick's Petition, 347 Mich. 620, 81 N.W.2d 357 (1957), where
the doctor's office was located next door to the optical company.
42. See Comment, Physician Ownership of Pharmacies, 41 NOTRE DAMME LAwYER 49,
53-54 (1965).
43. WAsH. REV. CODE § 19.68.010 (1969).
44. Id.
846
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the court did not consider the problem of illegal "furnishings." There
is a prohibited "furnishing" whenever the doctor furnishes the patient
with medical supplies45 and benefits financially as a result.46
The "furnishings" provision has two important functions. For one,
the referral prohibition discussed above was partly aimed at halting
unnecessary prescriptions in order to get a rebate; it would be of no
value if physicians could make the same gains by in-office sales. For
another, the patients have a right to be protected from professional
fees disguised as the cost of materials prescribed.4 7
In Inland, if the doctors had been selling optical supplies from their
office at a profit they would have been in violation of the "furnishings"
provision. Alternatively, if the optical company had sold optical sup-
plies for a profit to the doctors who in turn had sold them at "cost,"
this too would have been a violation because, as stockholders of the
optical supply corporation, the doctors would have profited indirectly
from dividends or stock appreciation. The same result could arguably
be reached if the doctor only owned a few shares in a public corpora-
tion. The difference between selling optical goods bought from a
wholly physician-owned corporation and sales of goods produced by
a company in which they owned only 10%o of the stock seems to be
one of degree only. There would be no such violation, however, as
long as the doctors did not sell those supplies to their patients.
In sum, the "furnishings" prohibition does not preclude physician
ownership of a medical supply corporation. All it requires is that the
physician either not sell any of the products from that operation to
his patients, or, if he does, that he sell them at cost-that is, not the
price paid to the supplier, but the cost to the supplier in manufacturing
or purchasing the item.
45. For example, when the physician sells the glasses made by the optician which
VAsH. RFV. CODE § 18.34.010 (1957) allows the physician to employ in his office. There
is no violation, however, if no profit is made on the sales.
46. Physician ownership of a medical supply operation does not by itself violate the
"furnishings" requirement of WASH. Rav. CODE § 19.68.010, because the "furnishings"
have to be by the doctor, just as the "referral" impliedly has to mean a referral by the
doctor. A physician-owned corporation, therefore, cannot violate the "furnishings"
requirement unless the doctor sells the supplies distributed by the corporation to his
patients. In sum, the doctors can run an optical supply corporation, and profit by it,
but must do so without the kind of referral-by-location that was enjoined in Inland.
47. WAsix. Rav. COD- § 19.68.040 (1957) provides:
.. . that persons so licensed shall only be authorized by law to charge or receive
compensation for professional services rendered if such services are actually rendered
by the licensee and not otherwise.
847
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III. THE EMPLOYEE EXCEPTION
R.C.W. § 18.34.010 indicates that a physician or optometrist may
hire opticians to work under his personal supervision. And, although
R.C.W. § 19.68.040 allows a physician ordinarily to charge only for
his own professional services, it does permit doctors who work to-
gether as co-partners to charge for the services of both, and authorizes
physicians to charge for the services rendered by the employees of
the firm or association. 48 To fall within the "employee exception" to
the anti-kickback provision, there must be immediate, direct, and
personal supervision of the employee by the physician.49 In other
words, it must be obvious to the patient that the doctors have some
control over what their employees are doing.
The "employee exception" is important in three respects. First,
there is never a referral with regard to an employee. Second, the wages
paid for work of an employee can be charged to a patient pursuant to
R.C.W. § 19.68.040, although no profit can accrue to the doctors
because it would violate the "furnishings" prohibition of R.C.W.
§ 19.68.010. Finally, a person who is not an employee of the doctors
may profit from his sales to the public; in other words, by forming a
corporation and making sure that its operations are not so closely
related to the doctors' as to constitute a "referral," the doctors may
benefit by appreciation of stock value or receipt of dividends.
CONCLUSION
The Inland court has provided some guidelines for the medical
profession to use in the interpretation of R.C.W. ch. 19.68. It ruled
that a "rebate" encompasses a wide variety of arrangements, and that
nearly any financial remuneration to the physician can be a "rebate."
However, it also settled that when the supplier is not an employee of
a doctor, there is no violation of the statute unless there is a "refer-
ral." A "referral" would be found wherever there are indications that
the patient's freedom of choice among suppliers is being restricted,
either directly or indirectly.
48. See Inland, 76 Wash. Dec. 2d at 578, 456 P.2d at 1019 (1969). Thus, the legis-
lature clearly intended to permit and encourage medical clinics.
49. See note 16 supra.
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Yet, the Inland decision, necessarily limited to a particular fact
pattern, did not comprehensively interpret the anti-kickback statute.
This Note has attempted to take up where the court left off. In par-
ticular, the supreme court did not discuss the statute's "furnishings"
provision. Under this provision, if a physician or his employee were
furnishing items to a patient, it would seem that the statute would
permit remuneration for the actual costs of materials and labor. But,
given the reading of R.C.W. § 19.68.010 put forth in this Note,50 if
a physician is selling medical supplies for a profit, he is violating the
"furnishings" provision. Although it is conceivable that there are
physicians operating in violation of this code section, no action has
as yet been taken to utilize the criminal sanctions of the statute. Per-
haps this is so because the statute is ambiguous on its face.5
What is needed is a clear and concise amendment of R.C.W.
§ 19.68.010 which would specifically state that a doctor cannot receive
financial remuneration for referral of a patient or for sale of any
medical supplies to a patient. If such an amendment were passed and
enforced, the patient would be better assured of obtaining proper
medical attention, and the physician would know exactly what he
could and could not do so far as both referrals and sales are con-
cerned 2
50. See Section II.B. supra.
51. See note 2 supra for full text. The statute's ambiguity is demonstrated by the
fact that the superior court and the supreme court arrived at different interpretations
as to whether a physician may properly own stock in a medical supply operation. It
should also be noted that neither the parties nor amici read the statute in the same
way the supreme court did.
52. In the last year the question has been raised whether physicians should be per-
mitted to sell eyewear at all. In the program 60 Minutes, Volume II, No. 4, as broad-
cast over C.B.S. Television, Tuesday, October 28, 1969, 10:00-11:00 p.m. E.S.T., some
doubt was expressed as to the correctness of this practice. In the report, C.B.S. sent
one of their employees around the country to the offices of various ophthalmologists and
optometrists. This reporter had 20/20 vision. In three of his twenty-eight visits he was
informed that he needed glasses; one of these was an ophthalmologist's office. Two of
these three also sold glasses; the C.B.S. employee purchased the prescribed glasses in
the offices. The inference from these results seems to be that where glasses are being sold
there may be a tendency on the part of some ophthalmologists and optometrists to find
more wrong with one's eyes than there really is. As C.B.S. put it,
If you ask someone for advice on whether or not you need some piece of equip-
ment and the person you ask is in the position of making a profit by selling it to
you, we all know it's highly unlikely that he will tell you you don't need it.
Transcript, 60 Minutes, supra.
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